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Abstract
This paper develops a search-theoretic model of the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of asset returns, abstracting from risk premia and focusing exclusively
on liquidity. I derive a float-adjusted return model (FARM), explaining
the pricing of liquidity with a simple linear formula: In equilibrium, the
liquidity spread of an asset is proportional to the inverse of its free float,
the portion of its market capitalization available for sale. This suggests
that the free float is an appropriate measure of liquidity, consistent with
the linear specifications commonly estimated in the empirical literature.
The qualitative predictions of the model corroborate much of the empiri-
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1 Introduction
Why do different assets earn different expected returns? One fundamental reason
is that they may bear different risks. Many empirical studies, however, suggest
that risk characteristics cannot explain all variation in expected returns. After
controlling for risk premia, expected returns appear to be positively related to
bid-ask spreads, and negatively related to turnover and dollar trading volume.
These patterns suggest that returns are related to liquidity, broadly defined as the
ease of buying and selling. Liquidity is reflected in small trading costs, measured
for instance by the bid-ask spread, and associated with the opportunity to buy
or sell large quantities in a short time, at a similar price. These properties may
be proxied by turnover or trading volume.
This paper provides a dynamic asset pricing model in which cross-sectional
variation in asset returns is exclusively due to liquidity differences. Its first objec-
tive is to explain the pricing of liquidity differences and to suggest an appropriate
measure of liquidity. Its second objective is to reproduce some of the qualitative
relationships documented by the empirical literature.
In our model, investors cannot trade instantly in multilateral Walrasian mar-
ket. Instead, trade is bilateral: investors have to search for each others, meet in
pairs, and bargain over prices. In this environment, a more liquid asset is defined
as one with smaller trading delays: buyers and sellers of that asset are more likely
to be found in a short time. This search framework applies most directly to over-
the-counter markets such as the Treasury market, the corporate-bond market, or
markets for financial derivatives. More generally, it applies to trades that are not
arranged in a centralized market, such as block trades in the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) upstairs market. Lastly, the search friction is likely to have an
impact on asset prices even in markets where security dealers provide immediacy
to outside investors. First, the search friction determines investors’ outside op-
tion when they trade with dealers. Second, dealers might have to search for end
investors in order to unload their inventories, and would charge the associated
search cost to their customers. Third, in some markets, such as the corporate-
bond market, dealers typically act as a brokers and search for counterparties on
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the behalves of their customers.
In the present model, many different assets are traded. Investors allocate
their fixed budgets of search efforts to the various assets. They recognize that
the value of searching for a particular asset is related to the likelihood of finding
a counterparty for that asset in a short time. The first-order condition of the
associated search optimization problem is key to the model’s implications, as it
reflects how the likelihood of finding an asset is priced in equilibrium. Specifically,
in equilibrium, investors are indifferent between searching for alternative traded
assets, under natural technical conditions. This indifference property gives rise
to a distribution of “liquidity premia.” Namely, an asset that is easier to find is
sold at a higher price.
The first contribution of this paper is to derive a float-adjusted return model,
or FARM, explaining the pricing of liquidity differences with the following linear
formula
Rk −RL =
φ¯
φk
(RM −RL) . (1)
On the left-hand side of (1), Rk denotes the return of asset k, one of the many
assets traded in the steady-state equilibrium, and RL denotes the return of an
appropriately defined ‘perfectly liquid’ asset. On the right-hand side of (1), φk
denotes the free float of asset k, defined as the portion of the market capitalization
available for sale; φ¯ denotes the market average free float; and, lastly, RM is the
float-weighted market return. In words, the FARM (1) states that, in steady
state, the liquidity spread Rk − RL of asset k is proportional to the inverse of
its (relative) free float. The constant of proportionality is the liquidity spread
RM −RL of the float-weighted market return.
Many empirical studies of liquidity spreads estimate linear models. They
control for risk with some factor model, and measure an asset liquidity by its
bid-ask spread, its trading volume, or its turnover. The FARM (1) suggests that,
with such a linear specification, liquidity could also be measured by the free float.
In traditional Walrasian asset-pricing models with liquidity effects, such as
those of Amihud and Mendelson [1986], Constantinides [1986], Heaton and Lucas
[1996], Vayanos [1998], and Huang [2003], assets can be bought and sold instantly,
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but differ by an exogenously given transaction cost. A more liquid asset is defined
as one with a smaller transaction cost. In these models, cross-sectional variation
in asset returns is explained by exogenously specified differences in transaction
costs. A second contribution of this paper is to explain cross-sectional variation
in asset returns without relying on an exogenously specified cross-sectional vari-
ation in transaction costs. Although, in the model proposed here, the search
technology is the same for all assets, heterogeneous bid-ask spreads arise endoge-
nously. Cross-sectional variation in asset returns is explained by the distribution
of ownership.
This paper extends the one-asset model of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen
[2005] by allowing investors to trade many assets. The present cross-sectional
analysis could not have been conducted in the one-asset model, which examines
the impact of liquidity on asset prices only by comparative statics. For instance,
in the one-asset model, an increase in the quantity of shareholders results in
a positive shift of the supply curve, and thus decreases the price of the asset.
In the multiple-assets model, one can keep the total quantity of shareholders
constant, and study an equilibrium in which some assets have more shareholders
than others. This isolates a liquidity effect: An asset with more shareholders is
easier to find, and has a higher price.
Search-theoretic approaches to liquidity have been explored in the monetary
literature, following Kiyotaki and Wright [1989]. Most notably, Wallace [2000]
focuses on the relative liquidity of intrinsically worthless assets (currency) and
assets earning a positive dividend (bonds). The model presented here has no room
for currency, and focuses on assets with relatively homogeneous characteristics.
This paper is closely related to the independent work of Vayanos and Wang
[2003]. In order to study liquidity difference between on-the-run and off-the-
run bonds, they provide a two-asset extension of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen
[2005]. They analyze the impact of investor heterogeneity on the concentration
of liquidity across markets, and focus most of their analysis on welfare. In the
present paper, by contrast, I analyze the impact of asset heterogeneity, and focus
most of the analysis on pricing and measurement. In particular, I show that the
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FARM (1) holds in an equilibrium with arbitrarily many assets.
2 Trading Many Assets
This section presents the basic model, in which investors cannot buy and sell
assets instantly. Rather, they allocate search resources to asset-specific “trad-
ing specialists,” who search for counterparties. When two investors meet, they
bargain over the terms of trade. (The specialists could bargain on their behalves.)
2.1 The Economic Environment
This subsection describes the model setup.
Information and Preferences
Time is treated continuously, and runs forever. A probability space (Ω,F , P ) is
fixed, as well as a filtration {Ft, t ≥ 0} satisfying the usual conditions (Protter
[1990]). There are many assets k ∈ {1, . . . , K} in positive supply. Asset k has a
measure sk ∈ (0, 1) of shares outstanding, and every share of an asset pays the
same dividend rate δ > 0.
The economy is populated by a unit-mass continuum of infinitely-lived and
risk-neutral investors who discount the future at the constant rate r > 0. An
investor enjoys the consumption of a non-storable nume´raire good called “cash,”
with a marginal utility normalized to 1. In order to make side payments, investors
are endowed with a technology that instantly produces cash, at unit marginal
cost.1
An investor has either a high-valuation or a low-valuation for holding assets.
When he has a high valuation and holds asset k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, he enjoys the (per
unit) utility flow δ. With a low valuation, he enjoys a utility flow δ− x, for some
1In other words, negative consumption of cash is allowed. Appendix B shows that, equiva-
lently, one could assume that investors borrow and save cash in some “bank account,” at the
exogenously given interest rate r¯ = r, and subject to an appropriate Transversality Condition.
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holding cost x > 0.2 Investors switch randomly, and pair-wise independently,
from a low valuation to a high valuation with intensity3 γu, and from a high
valuation to a low valuation with intensity γd.
An investor is permitted to hold either zero or one share of some asset,4 and
can choose which asset to hold. We let s ≡ (s1, s2, . . . , sK) denote the distribution
of ownership. We also assume that
K∑
k=1
sk ≡ S <
γu
γu + γd
, (2)
which means that the total supply S of assets is less than the steady-state mea-
sure of high-valuation investors.5 Given that investors can hold at most one unit
of some asset, equation (2) implies that, in a multilateral Walrasian market, the
“marginal investor” has a high valuation. Therefore, in a Walrasian market, all
assets have the same equilibrium price δ/r.
Investor Types
An investor’s type is made up of her marginal utility (high h, or low ℓ), and her
ownership status, for each asset type k ∈ {1, . . . , K} (owner ok, or nonowner n).
2Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen [2005] provide a formal model of the holding cost. They
assume that risk-averse investors receive some non-tradable endowment stream which is some-
times highly correlated with the traded asset. In a first-order Taylor expansion of an investor’s
continuation utility, x represents the cost of holding an asset when it has a high correlation
with the endowment.
One could also view the holding cost as the intensity of an investor’s need for cash, when he
is borrowing constrained and cannot borrow against the full value of his asset holding. Suppose
that, if the asset is worth pk, an investor can only borrow pk − h, for some “haircut” h. If the
shadow value of relaxing the borrowing constraint is φ, then the holding cost is x = φh.
3For instance, if the investor’s valuation is low, the distribution of the next switching time
to high is exponential with parameter γu. The successive switching times are independent.
4Because he has linear utility over dividend, an investor finds it optimal to hold either the
minimum quantity of zero share, or the maximum quantity of one share. Normalizing the
maximum holding to be one share is without loss of generality, in the following sense: the
results would remain unchanged if one assumes a maximum holding of N shares, and redefine
the dividend rate to be δ/N .
5An application of the Law of Large Numbers implies that the steady-state measure of high-
valuation investors is equal to the stationary probability γu/(γd+γu) of being in a state of high
valuation.
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Hence, the set of investor types is
I = {hn, ℓn, ho1, . . . , hoK, ℓo1, . . . , ℓoK}. (3)
For each i ∈ I, µi denotes the fraction of investors of type i, and, given the
asset fundamentals and the trading environment (to be defined), Vi denotes the
continuation utility of an investor of type i. A precise definition of Vi is provided
in Appendix B.
Random Matching
At any point in time, each investor is endowed with a mass ν¯ of “trading special-
ists” who search for specific trading counterparties, in a sense that is now to be
described. A trading specialist of type (i, j) ∈ I2 works for an investor of type
i, and specializes in contacting specialists working for investors of type j. Thus,
contacts that could result in a trade occur only between specialists of types (i, j)
and (j, i).
An investor of type i maintains on her “trading staff” a quantity νij of spe-
cialists of type (i, j), subject to the resource constraint
∑
j∈I νij ≤ ν¯. Thus, the
mass of specialists of type (i, j) in the entire specialist population is µiνij. A
given specialist makes contacts with other specialists, pair-wise independently at
Poisson arrival times with intensity Λ > 0. Because scaling ν¯ and Λ up and
down, respectively, by the same factor has no effect, one can assume without
loss of generality that ν¯ = 1. Contacts are also pair-wise independent with the
investor’s valuation processes. Given a contact, because of the random-matching
assumption, the probability that the contact is made with a specialist of type
(i, j) is µiνij. That is, conditional on making a contact, all trading specialists in
the entire specialist population are “equally likely” to be contacted. Adapting
the usual random-matching assumption that the Law of Large Numbers applies
(see, for instance, Diamond [1982]), contacts between specialists of types (i, j)
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and (j, i), for i 6= j, occur continually at a total (almost sure) rate of
µiνijΛµjνji + µjνjiΛµiνij = 2Λµiνijµjνji. (4)
The first term on the left-hand side of (4) is the total rate of contacts made by
all specialists of type (i, j), and received by specialists of type (j, i). Specifically,
each specialist of the mass µiνij of specialists of type (i, j) makes contacts at rate
Λ, and such contacts are received by some specialist of type (j, i) with probability
µjνji. Similarly, the second term is the total rate of contact made by specialists
of type (j, i) and received by specialists of type (i, j).
For each investor of type i, λij ≡ Λνij is the intensity of contacts with some
other specialists, made by the mass νij of specialists of type (i, j). Thus, one
can view an investor of type i as endowed with a budget Λ > 0 of search effort,
allocating some intensity λij to the search for investors of type j, subject to the
ressource constraint
∑
j∈I λij ≤ Λ. With this new notation, adopted for the
remainder of the paper, the total (almost sure) rate of contact between investors
of types i and j is
2µiµj
λijλji
Λ
. (5)
An investor maintaining trading specialists can be viewed as an investment
firm with separate units that trade specific securities. A typical unit trades
securities of a specific industry, such as “telecom” or “entertainment,” or trades
securities with a specific payoff structure, such as fixed-income or derivatives.
Specialization in trading reflects the costs of collecting and processing information
regarding the supply and demand of assets, as well as the fundamentals of the
underlying cash flows.
2.2 Equilibrium
This subsection presents an analysis of the decisions of investors: whether or not
to trade in a given encounter, and how to allocate search intensity across types of
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trading encounters. Then, it describes the dynamics of the distribution of types.
Lastly, it defines an equilibrium.
Trade Among Investors
Trade between investors of types i and j occurs at a strictly positive rate if (a)
the gain from trade from such a pair is strictly positive,6 and (b) these two types
of investors maintain trading specialists who are searching for each other, that is,
if λijλji > 0.
In equilibrium, the gains from trade will be strictly positive when a low-
valuation owner (one of type ℓok) contacts a high-valuation non-owner (of type
hn). The ℓok investor will sell her asset to the hn investor, in exchange for some
cash payment pk.
7 The price arises in a simple Nash-bargaining game, as follows.
The total surplus of such a transaction is
(Vhok − Vhn)− (Vℓok − Vℓn) ≡ ∆Vhk −∆Vℓk. (6)
We study those equilibria in which the ℓok agent receives a fixed fraction q ∈ (0, 1)
of the total surplus. This implies that the price of asset k is, in an equilibrium,
pk = q∆Vhk + (1− q)∆Vℓk. (7)
The gains from trade can also be positive between a low-valuation owner ℓok
and a high-valuation owner hoj. These two investors may swap assets, and one
investor may simultaneously transfer cash to the other. The total surplus of a
swap between a ℓok agent and a hoj agent is Vℓoj − Vℓok + Vhok − Vhoj.
We guess (and verify later) that, in equilibrium, an ℓok investor will not
maintain trading specialists who search for swaps with hoj investors, but only
trading specialists who search for an outright sale with hn investors. In other
words, the net utility of searching for a swap is, in the equilibrium we analyze,
strictly less than the net utility of searching for an outright sale, a condition that
6An arbitrarily small transaction cost rules out trade when the gain is zero.
7A cash payment payments is a lump of consumption good, instantly produced at unit
marginal cost.
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can be written:
µhoj(Vℓoj − Vℓok + Vhok − Vhoj) < µhn(∆Vhk −∆Vℓk), (8)
for all (k, j) ∈ {1, . . . , K}2. We verify condition (8) in the proof of Proposition 3.
Under condition (8), an ℓok investor allocates all of her search intensity Λ
to the search for hn investors. On the other hand, an hn investor allocates in-
tensities, denoted λ1, . . . , λK , to simultaneous searches for investors of respective
types ℓo1, . . . , ℓoK. These allocations of search intensity are illustrated in Figure
1.
Definition 1 A search-intensity allocation is some λ ∈ RK+ with
∑K
k=1 λk ≤ Λ.
hn
ℓo1
ℓok
ℓoK
...
...
λ1
λk
λK
Λ
Λ
Λ
Figure 1: Allocating Search Intensity
An hn investor searches ℓok investors with intensity λk, for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. An ℓok investor, on the other-hand, searches hn
investors with intensity Λ.
Investors’ Problem
This paragraph characterizes the equilibrium continuation utilities Vi, i ∈ I.
As shown in Appendix B by an optimality verification argument, the Bellman
10
equation for the continuation utility of a buyer hn is
rVhn = max
λ˜1,...,λ˜K
{
γd(Vℓn − Vhn) + 2
K∑
k=1
λ˜kµℓok (Vhok − Vhn − pk)
}
, (9)
subject to
∑K
k=1 λ˜k ≤ Λ and λ˜k ≥ 0, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Tilde notation ( ˜ ) is
used to distinguish the search intensity λk that will prevail in equilibrium for all
investors of type hn from the intensity λ˜k that is to be chosen by an individual
investor of type hn, taking others’ search intensities as given. The Bellman
equation (9) breaks up the “flow” continuation utility rVhn into two terms. The
first term, γd(Vℓn − Vhn), is the expected flow utility of a transition from a high
to a low valuation because, with intensity γd, a hn investor makes a transition
to the ℓn type. The second term is the expected flow utility of searching for
alternative assets. Namely, with intensity 2λ˜kµℓok, an hn investor finds asset k,
buys it at price pk and makes a transition to type hok. Similarly, other investors’
continuation utilities solve the following system of Bellman equations
rVhok = δ + γd(Vℓok − Vhok) (10)
rVℓok = δ − x+ γu(Vhok − Vℓok) + 2λkµhn(Vℓn − Vℓok + pk) (11)
rVℓn = γu(Vhn − Vℓn), (12)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Steady-state distribution of Types
We now provide the equations characterizing the steady-state distribution of in-
vestors’ types. First, of course, all assets are being held and the mass of investors
is equal to one:
sk = µℓok + µhok (13)
1 =
K∑
k=1
(µℓok + µhok) + µhn + µℓn. (14)
11
Second, in a steady state, the inflow and outflow of investors in each type is zero.
For example, for the high-valuation non-owner hn, we have
γuµℓn = γdµhn + 2
K∑
k=1
λkµhnµℓok. (15)
The left-hand side is the flow of ℓn investors who switch from a low valuation
to a high valuation, transiting to the hn type. The first term on the right-hand
side, γdµhn, is the flow of hn investors who switch to a low valuation. The second
term is the flow of hn investors who meet sellers of some asset k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
and buy an asset. Similarly, for the low-valuation owner ℓok
γdµhok = γuµℓok + 2λkµhnµℓok. (16)
for k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Lastly, similar calculations (see Appendix A) show that the
inflow-outflow equations for investors of types ℓn and hok are the same as (15)
and (16). We can now define:
Definition 2 A steady-state symmetric equilibrium is a collection p = (p1, . . . , pK)
of prices, a collection V = (Vhn, Vhok, Vℓok, Vℓn)1≤k≤K of continuation utilities, a
distribution µ = (µhn, µhok, µℓok, µℓn)1≤k≤K of types, and a search-intensity allo-
cation λ≫ 0, such that
(i) Steady-State: Given λ, µ solves the system (13)-(16).
(ii) Optimality: Given λ, µ, and p, V and (λ˜1, . . . , λ˜K) = λ solve the system
(9)-(12) of Bellman equations. The no-swap condition (8) holds for all
(k, j) ∈ {1, . . . , K}2.
(iii) Pricing: the prices satisfy equation (7), for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Here, symmetry means that all hn investors choose the same search intensity
allocation λ. Also, this definition restricts attention to equilibria having two
specific properties: there are no swap and all assets are searched, that is λ≫ 0.8
8There are other types of equilibria. For instance, because of the random-matching spec-
ification, investors of type i and j meet only if i searches for j and j searches for i. Hence,
there could be a coordination failure. For example, there is an equilibrium in which no investor
search: namely, given that no other investor searches, not searching is optimal.
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In particular, since (9) is a linear program, λ ≫ 0 implies that hn investors are
indifferent between searching for any two assets. Hence, the first-order condition
of the hn investor’s problem, (9), is
µℓok(Vhok − Vhn − pk) = µℓoj(Vhoj − Vhn − pj) (17)
⇐⇒ µℓok(1− q)(∆Vhk −∆Vℓk) = µℓoj(1− q)(∆Vhj −∆Vℓj), (18)
for all (k, j) ∈ {1, . . . , K}2, and where (18) follows from substituting (7) into (17).
This first-order condition reflects “search indifference,” meaning that the marginal
utility of spending an additional unit of search intensity on a given asset is equated
across assets. This marginal utility is decomposed as follows: Conditional on
establishing a contact, a seller of asset k is found with probability µℓok. Then,
the buyer receives a fraction 1− q of the transaction surplus ∆Vhk −∆Vℓk.
The total transaction surplus may be interpreted as a bid-ask spread, in the
following sense. Suppose that the seller’s bargaining power is a random vari-
able with support [0, 1] and mean q, independently distributed across encounters.
Then, the maximum buying price (the ask) is ∆Vhk and the minimum selling price
price (the bid) is ∆Vℓk. The average price of asset k is pk = q∆Vhk+(1− q)∆Vℓk.
Following this interpretation, condition (18) means that an asset that is easier to
find (with a larger µℓok) has a narrower bid-ask spread. This suggests a negative
relationship between liquidity and bid-ask spread.
2.3 Existence and Uniqueness
This section provides technical conditions under which an equilibrium exists and
is unique. It first analyzes the steady-state distribution of types. Second, in order
to prove the existence of an equilibrium, it studies the indifference conditions (18).
First, the study of (13)-(16) presented in Appendix A shows the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Given a search intensity allocation λ, the system (13)-(16) has
a unique solution µ = (µhn, µhok, µℓn, µℓok)1≤k≤K ∈ [0, 1]
2K+2.
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The Bellman equations can be simplified as follows. First, one defines the net
utility of searching for asset k,
Wk ≡ µℓok(1− q)(∆Vhk −∆Vℓk), (19)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Clearly, the “search indifference” marginal conditions (18)
can be written as
Wk = W, (20)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, and for some positive constant W to be determined.
Substituting (20) into equation (9), combining the Bellman equations (9) through
(11), and using the pricing equation (7) one finds that
rWk = (1− q)µℓokx− (γu + γd + 2λkqµhn)Wk − 2Λ(1− q)µℓokW, (21)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Replacing µhok = sk − µℓok in equation (16), we find that
2λkµhn =
γdsk
µℓok
− (γd + γu). (22)
Substituting (22) into (21), using (20) and rearranging gives
γdskq
(1− q)x
1
µ2ℓok
+
r + (1− q)(γd + γu)
(1− q)x
1
µℓok
+
2Λ
x
=
1
W
. (23)
This quadratic equation allows one to write µℓok = mk(W ), for someW < x/(2Λ),
and for some continuous and increasing function mk( · ).
Now, the steady-state measure of high-valuation investors is equal to the sta-
tionary probability of being in a state of high valuation9
µhn +
K∑
k=1
µhok =
γu
γu + γd
. (24)
Combining (24) with (13) shows
µhn =
γu
γu + γd
− S +
K∑
k=1
µℓok. (25)
9This can also be shown by summing equation (16) over k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, subtracting equation
(15) and using (14).
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Substituting (25) into (22) gives
2λk
(
γu
γu + γd
− S +
K∑
k=1
mk(W )
)
=
γdsk
mk(W )
− (γd + γu), (26)
which shows that
∑K
k=1 λk = Λ only if
2Λ
(
γu
γu + γd
− S +
K∑
k=1
mk(W )
)
−
K∑
k=1
(
γdsk
mk(W )
− (γd + γu)
)
= 0. (27)
The left-hand side of (27) is strictly increasing in W because mk( · ) is strictly
increasing for each k. Hence, (27) uniquely characterizes a candidate equilibrium
W . Once W is found, the other equilibrium objects are uniquely characterized:
the search intensity allocation λ by (26), the distribution µ of types by (13)-(16),
the continuation utilities V by (9)-(11), and the prices p by (7). This implies
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness.) There is at most one equilibrium.
In order to show existence, one first analyzes the case of identical asset charac-
teristics, for the distribution sˆ = (S/K, . . . , S/K) of ownership. One shows the
existence of a symmetric equilibrium with λˆk = Λ/K, following Duffie, Gaˆrleanu
and Pedersen [2005]. Then, one applies the Implicit Function Theorem to equa-
tion (27), showing existence in a neighborhood of this symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Existence.) Let sˆ = (S/K, . . . , S/K). Then, there is a neigh-
borhood N ⊂ RK+ of sˆ, such that, for all s ∈ N , there is an equilibrium.
Proof. If the assets have identical characteristics, it is natural to guess that there is a
symmetric equilibrium, with µˆℓok = µˆℓo/K and λˆk = Λ/K. The equilibrium equations
are those of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen [2005], with “λ” there being replaced here
by “Λ/K.” Their results imply that investors’ values are strictly positive, and that
there are strictly positive gains from trade between investors of types hn and ℓok.
Furthermore, since assets have identical characteristics, there is no gain from swapping
assets. Thus, ℓok investors strictly prefer searching for an outright sale with an hn
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investor to searching for a swap with an hoj investor, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Since the
left-hand side of (27) is strictly increasing in W , the Implicit Function Theorem (see
Taylor and Mann [1983], chapter 12) can be applied: This provides a neighborhood
N ⊂ RK+ of sˆ, such that, for all s ∈ N , there exists a candidate equilibrium W = h(s),
for some continuous function h( · ). The other candidate equilibrium objects (V, µ, λ)
are easily expressed as continuous functions of W and thus as continuous functions of
s. The search-indifference marginal conditions (20) are satisfied by construction. The
no swap condition (8) as well as all other relevant inequalities hold by continuity. 
The proof shows in particular that, if assets characteristics are sufficiently
homogeneous, ℓok investors are not searching for swaps. This follows from the
fact that the net utility of swapping two assets with nearly identical characteristics
is close to zero, and turns out to be strictly less than the net utility of searching
for an outright sale.
Does there always exist an equilibrium in which all assets are traded? The
following proposition provides a partial answer, in a two-asset economy. Specifi-
cally, I show that if the assets have sufficiently different supplies, there cannot be
an equilibrium in which both are traded, in the following sense.
Proposition 4 (Non-Existence of an equilibrium with λ≫ 0.) LetK = 2,
and s = (s1, S − s1), for some S ∈ (0, 1) and s1 ∈ (0, S). There is a ε > 0 such
that, for any s1 < ε, an equilibrium with λ≫ 0 cannot exist.
Proof. Let’s consider a two-asset economy with s1 = ε > 0 and s2 = S − ε > 0. One
shows that, if ε is small enough, there is no candidate equilibrium in which λ ≫ 0.
If such an equilibrium exists, then both assets would satisfy (23). For Asset 1, since
µℓo1 ≤ s1 = ε, (23) would imply that the candidate W goes to zero as ε goes to zero.
In turn, for Asset 2, (23) would imply that µℓo2 goes to zero as ε goes to zero, but
then s2/µℓo2 = (S − ε)/µℓo2 goes to infinity as ε goes to zero. Therefore, equation (27)
cannot hold. 
Existence in Proposition 3, and non-existence in Proposition 4, are proved by
studying how the left-hand side of (27) depends on s. When asset characteristics
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are sufficiently similar, the equation has a solution. Alternatively, when the
quantity of shareholders of an asset is sufficiently small relative to quantities of
shareholders of other assets, (27) has no solution.
An equilibrium may fail to exist because, when s1 is small, the probability
of finding a seller is even smaller. An investor is willing to search for this asset
only if she is compensated by a sufficiently low price. If s1 is small enough, the
appropriate compensation results in a negative price, and thus cannot be the
basis of an equilibrium.
3 The Pricing of Liquidity Differences
This section analyzes the pricing implications of the model. It first discusses the
pricing of liquidity. Then, it derives the float-adjusted return model or FARM,
which states that, in equilibrium, the liquidity spread of an asset is proportional
to the inverse of its free float. Lastly, it relates the cross-sectional variation in
asset returns to the exogenous distributions s = (s1, . . . , sK) of ownership.
3.1 Cross-sectional Prices
The pricing equation (7) can be written
pk = ∆Vhk − (1− q)(∆Vhk −∆Vℓk). (28)
The first term on the right-hand side, ∆Vhk, is the reservation value of a hn
investor. The second term is the discount obtained by a hn investor with bar-
gaining power 1 − q. Subtracting the Bellman equations (9) from (10) gives an
expression for the reservation value ∆Vhk which, when substituted in (28), gives
rpk = δ − 2ΛW − γd(∆Vhk −∆Vℓk)− r(1− q)(∆Vhk −∆Vℓk). (29)
This equation breaks the price of asset k into four components. The first, δ, is the
flow value of dividend payments. The second component, 2ΛW , is the flow value
of searching for an asset. An hn investor obtains this discount because he has the
option of not buying asset k and continuing his search. The third component,
γd(∆Vhk−∆Vℓk), is the instantaneous cost of switching to the low valuation, and
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not being able to sell the asset instantly. The last component is the bargaining
discount.
It is instructive to compare the price pk of the asset in this dynamic bargaining
market with its price δ/r in a multilateral Walrasian market, where all assets can
be bought and sold instantly. In the Walrasian case, all discounts in (29) are
equal to zero. First, because the net utility of buying an asset is equal to zero,
the flow value of searching for an alternative asset is also equal to zero. Second,
because the asset can be sold instantly, the cost of switching to a low valuation
is equal to zero. Third, because sellers can find alternative buyers instantly, the
buyer’s bargaining discount is equal to zero.
3.2 A Float Adjusted Return Model
The price pL of a hypothetical ‘perfectly liquid’ asset, named asset L, is defined
by
rpL ≡ δ − 2ΛW. (30)
This price makes an hn investor indifferent between (i) searching for some asset
k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and (ii) buying asset L instantly, stopping search, and having the
option to sell the asset instantly at price pL.
Asset L is called ‘perfectly liquid’ because it can be bought and sold instantly.
Its price includes the discount 2ΛW because hn investors must be compensated
from stopping search when they buy it. Since asset L can be sold instantly at
price pL, however, the cost of switching to the low-marginal-utility state is equal
to zero.10 Subtracting equation (30) from equation (28) and rearranging, one
finds
r(pL − pk) = (γd + r(1− q))(∆Vhk −∆Vℓk). (31)
Together with the search-indifference condition (18), (31) implies that
pkµℓok
(
δ
pk
−
δ
pL
)
=
δ
rpL
(γd + r(1− q))W, (32)
10In the present model, the supply of asset L is zero and (30) should be viewed as a definition.
One can solve for an equilibrium in which asset L is in positive supply, and show that its
equilibrium price is pL, under natural technical conditions.
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where W is the net utility of searching for alternative assets. The returns of
assets k and L are respectively denoted by Rk ≡ δ/pk and RL ≡ δ/pL. The free
float of asset k is φk ≡ pkµℓok. This is the portion of its market capitalization
available for sale. With these notations, (32) can be written
φk(Rk −RL) =M, (33)
for some positive constant M which does not depend on k. Equation (33) states
that, in equilibrium, the liquidity spread Rk − RL of asset k is proportional
to the inverse of its free float φk. A convenient expression for the constant of
proportionality is obtained by summing equations (33) over k. The result is
summarized in
Proposition 5 (Float Adjusted Return Model, FARM.) In equilibrium, an
asset liquidity spread is proportional to the inverse of its free float. Namely, for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , K},
Rk −RL =
φ¯
φk
(RM −RL) , (34)
where Rk ≡ δ/pk and RL ≡ δ/pL are the returns of assets k and L, φk ≡ pkµℓok is
the free float of asset k, φ¯ ≡ 1/K
∑K
k=1 φk is the average free float in the market,
and RM is the float-weighted market return
RM ≡
K∑
k=1
φk∑K
j=1 φj
Rk. (35)
When studying the impact of liquidity on cross-sectional returns, many re-
searchers estimate linear models. For example, if they study stock returns, they
would first control for risk with a factor model such as Sharpe [1964]’s CAPM, or
the three-factor model of Fama and French [1993]. Then, they test the statisti-
cal significance of additional independent variables that proxy for liquidity, such
as bid-ask spread, trading volume, or turnover (Amihud and Mendelson [1986],
Brennan and Subrahmanyam [1996], or Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam
[1998]). The FARM (34) suggests that liquidity could also be measured by the
free float.
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The FARM (34) is a deterministic relationship between returns and float.
In a simple stochastic extension of this model, one can let the cumulative div-
idend rate of asset k ∈ {1, . . . , K} solve the stochastic differential equation
dDkt = δ dt+ σkdBkt, where (σ1, . . . , σK) ∈ R
K
+ and (B1t, . . . , BKt) is a standard
Brownian motion. Because our investors are risk-neutral and dividend shocks
are independent over time, this stochastic model is essentially equivalent to the
present deterministic one. The FARM (34) would also hold, with Rk being the
expected return of asset k.11
The FARM (34) also holds when holding costs x are heterogenous across as-
sets. It no longer holds, however, when the dividend rates δ are heterogenous: the
relationship between return and float would not be (inversely) linear. Numerical
calculations (not reported here) suggests that the relationship remains decreasing.
Some evidence on float and liquidity
Some evidence suggest that, in an empirical application, the float might be a good
measure of liquidity. First, some stock-index producers such as MSCI, NYSE, or
Dow Jones have started to publish free float-weighted stock market indexes. They
argue that, because indexes aim at being replicated by money managers, stocks
included in them should be weighted not only according to their relative size, but
also according to their liquidity and their “investability,” measured by their free
float.12
Second, researchers have documented that recently issued treasury bonds,
(or “on-the-run” bonds) are more liquid than older ones (or “off-the-run”) (see,
among others, Amihud and Mendelson [1991], Warga [1992], and Krishnamurthy
[2003]). A common explanation of the inferior liquidity of older bonds is their
11Then, the realized return over a holding period [T1, T2] is Rk(T2 − T1) + σk/pk
∫
T2
T1
dBkt.
12Measuring float in practice is a delicate issue because one has to decide which shares are
available for investment, and which ones are not. In our model, for example, the only shares
of asset k available for investment at price pk are the one held by low-valuation investors. One
might argue that the correct definition of float is the total number of share sk, because they
are available for investment at any price greater than ∆Vhk (moreover, a larger sk also results
in higher liquidity.) However, no investor in our model is willing to pay such a high price for
this asset.
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free float. For instance, Amihud and Mendelson [1991] argue that, because older
bonds have been traded for a longer time, a larger part of their supply is “locked
away” in investors portfolio (such as insurance companies) who are not standing
ready to sell.
Lastly, Chan, Chan and Fong [2004] study the impact of a reduction in free
float on asset liquidity. In August 1998, the Hong Kong monetary authority
opposed a speculative attack by aggressively buying the 33 stocks of the Hang
Seng 33 Index (HSI 33). The monetary authority absorbed about 7.3% of HSI
33 market capitalization and held these stocks for a long time period, resulting
in a reduction in the free float of these stocks. The authors show that, relative
to some control group with no free-float reduction, the HSI stocks experienced a
decrease in liquidity.
3.3 Explaining Cross-Sectional Returns
In the previous subsection, cross-sectional variation in asset returns was explained
by cross-sectional variation in free float, which is an endogenous variable. The
present subsection takes a step back and explains the cross-sectional variation
in asset returns by an exogenous variable, the distribution s = (s1, . . . , sK) of
ownership.13
Here, the cross-sectional variation in asset returns is not explained by an ex-
ogenously specified cross-sectional variation in transaction costs, in contrast with
the Walrasian models of Amihud and Mendelson [1986], Constantinides [1986],
Vayanos [1998], and Huang [2003]. In this model, because of search frictions,
investors cannot find buyers and sellers of specific assets instantly, and because
investors are impatient, the likelihoods of finding those buyers and sellers in a
short time are reflected in prices. One may view cross-sectional variation in
the likelihood of finding buyers and sellers as the natural counterpart of cross-
sectional variation in transaction costs. This cross-sectional variation is not,
13The same solution method can be applied to assets which are heterogenous in other dimen-
sions. For example, one could consider cross-sectional variations in dividends, holding costs, and
make asset heterogenous in terms of search costs. These extensions of our model are available
upon request.
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however, exogenously specified. Rather, it arises endogenously and is explained
by the distribution of ownership.
The following three equations are used. The main equation is the asset pricing
equation (28), written as
pk =
δ
r
−
2ΛW
r
−
(
1 +
γd
(1− q)r
)
W
µℓok
. (36)
The right-hand side is increasing in µℓok. In other words, an asset that is easier
to find (has larger µℓok) is sold at a higher price. The second equation (23) is of
the form
Ask
1
µ2ℓok
+B
1
µℓok
+ C =
1
W
, (37)
for some positive constants A, B, and C, which do not depend on k. The third
equation is easily derived from (22), and relates λk to the distribution of types
and sk:
µℓok
sk
=
γd
γd + γu + 2λkµhn
. (38)
The quantity λkµhn has several interpretations. First, it represents the demand
side of the market. The larger is λk, the more search occurs for asset k, and
the easier it is to sell this asset. It is natural to ask whether an asset that is
easier to sell is also easier to find. That is, can one view λkµhn as an increasing
function of µℓok? Equation (38) shows that the answer depends on the quantity
sk of shareholders, and is thus indeterminate at this stage of the analysis.
Second, λkµhn is negatively related to the mean holding period of asset k. The
holding period of a hok investor is some stopping time τh, decomposed as follows.
The investor holds the asset k until she switches to a state of low valuation at some
time t+τd, where τd is an exponentially distributed stopping time with parameter
γd. Then, she either meets a buyer or switches back to a high valuation at some
time t+ τd +min{τb, τu}, where τb and τu are exponentially distributed stopping
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times with respective parameters 2λkµhn and γu. If she switches back to a high
valuation utility, then her mean holding period is some stopping time τ˜h. Hence,
τh = τd + I{τu<τb}(τu + τ˜h) + I{τb≤τu}τb = τd +min{τu, τb}+ I{τu<τb}τ˜h. (39)
In a steady-state equilibrium, τ˜h and τh are identically distributed. Furthermore,
all the above stopping times are pairwise independent. Taking expectations of
both sides of (39), and using the fact that τh and τ˜h are identically distributed,
one finds that
E(τh) =
1
γd
+
1
γu + 2λkµhn
+
γu
γu + 2λkµhn
E(τh).
and therefore
E(τh) =
1
γd
+
1
2λkµhn
(
1 +
γu
γd
)
. (40)
This shows that the mean holding period E(τh) is a decreasing function of λkµℓn.
Equation (37) has the form
F (sk, µℓok) =
1
W
, (41)
for some function F ( · , · ) that is increasing in sk and decreasing in µℓok. This
implies that µellok is increasing in sk. In other words, an asset with more share-
holders is easier to find, is sold at a higher price, and has a lower return Rk = d/pk.
In order to derive a relationship between the quantity sk of shareholders and the
mean holding period (40), one writes equation (37) as
G
(
sk,
µℓok
sk
)
=
1
W
, (42)
for some function G( · , · ) that is decreasing in sk and decreasing in µℓok/sk. This
implies that µℓok/sk is a decreasing function of sk. From (38), it follows that λkµhn
is an increasing function of sk. In other words, an asset with more shareholders
has a shorter mean holding period. Lastly, since the total rate of contact between
buyers and sellers of asset k is 2λkµhnµℓok, an asset with more shareholders also
has a larger trading volume. The above discussion is summarized in
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Proposition 6 In equilibrium, sk > sj implies that µℓok > µℓoj, λk > λj, pk > pj,
Rk < Rj, and ∆Vhk −∆Vℓk < ∆Vhj −∆Vℓj.
In words, an asset with more shareholders is easier to find, easier to sell, has a
higher price, a lower return, and a narrower bid-ask spread. This implies in turn
that it also has a larger trading volume, a larger turnover, and a shorter mean
holding period.
In contrast with Proposition 6, the one-asset model of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and
Pedersen [2005] implies that an asset with a larger quantity of shareholders has
a lower price. Indeed, an increase in the quantity of shareholders results in
a positive shift of the supply curve, and hence lowers the price of the asset.
Similarly, in our model, a larger sk represents a larger supply. However, a larger
sk also endogenously results in a larger demand, represented by a larger search
intensity λk. Proposition 6 shows that the “demand shift” dominates, meaning
that an asset with larger sk has a higher price.
This model generates a positive relationship between returns and holding
periods with ex-ante identical investors, because returns and holding periods are
both negatively related to a common exogenous “liquidity” factor, the quantity of
shareholders. By contrast Amihud and Mendelson [1986] take the holding period
itself to be an exogenous parameter. A positive relationship between returns
and holding periods also arises endogenously in general equilibrium models with
transaction costs, such as those of Vayanos and Villa [1999] or Huang [2003], but
for a different reason. In these models, assets can be bought and sold instantly,
and an investor chooses to hold assets with larger transaction costs for a longer
period. These assets, in equilibrium, have higher expected returns. In the present
model, an asset cannot be bought and sold instantly, and an asset with a higher
return is harder to sell, and thus has a longer mean holding period.
3.4 An illustrative numerical example
There is much empirical evidence on the relationship between traditional liquidity
proxies and risk-adjusted expected returns. For example, after controlling for risk,
expected return appear to be positively related to bid-ask spread, and negatively
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Table 1: Parameter Values used in the Numerical Example.
Parameters Value or Distribution
Contact Intensity Λ 62, 500
Intensity of Switch to High γd 1
Intensity of Switch to Low γu 7/3
Discount Rate r 5%
Number of Assets K 100
Fraction of Shareholders sk ∼ Uniform([0.0042, 0.0078])
Holding cost x 5
Dividend Rate δ 1
Bargaining Power q 1/2
related to trading volume and turnover. This subsection presents a numerical
example suggesting that our model’s qualitative predictions are consistent with
these empirical evidence.
An equilibrium of the model is computed for a randomly generated economy
of K = 100 asset types.14 The ownerships sk are drawn independently from a
uniform distributions on some interval [s, s]. The dividend rate δ is set to 1 and
the holding cost x to 5. The bargaining power parameter is set to 1/2. The
equilibrium return Rk = δ/pk is plotted against various measures of liquidity
used in the empirical literature, which have direct counterparts in the theoretical
model. The relative bid-ask spread is 1−∆Vℓk/∆Vhk. The dollar trading volume
is pkλkµℓokµhn. The turnover is λkµℓokµhn/sk. The market capitalization is pksk.
The values of the exogenous parameters are as in Table 1.
The unit of time is one year. Assuming that the stock market opens 250
days a year and that there are 10 trading hours per day, Λ = 62500 means that
an investor establishes a contact with some other investor every 2.5 minutes, on
average. The discount rate r is 5%. Given the chosen uniform distribution for
sk, the expected aggregate supply of assets, E
(∑K
k=1 sk
)
, is 0.6. An investor
switches to a low valuation on average once a year, which implies an annual
turnover slightly below 100
14One first solves (27) for W . This can be done quickly since equation (23), characterizing
mk(W ), is quadratic. Once W is found, the remaining equilibrium objects are easily computed
using the various equations derived during the existence proof.
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Figure 2 displays the results of the computations. Returns and relative bid-ask
spreads are positively related. In contrast with the theoretical results of Amihud
and Mendelson [1986], the relationship is almost linear and not concave. Consis-
tently with the empirical evidence, returns are negatively related to turnover and
trading volume. The holding period is positively related to returns.
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Figure 2: Cross-sectional variation in returns, explained by “liquidity proxies.”
4 Conclusion
This paper uses a search-theoretic model to study the impact of heterogeneity in
asset liquidity on the cross section and the time series of asset returns. The main
result of the paper is the float-adjusted return model, or FARM: in equilibrium,
the liquidity spread on an asset is proportional to the inverse of its free float.
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Hence, the free float is a measure of liquidity that is consistent with the linear
specifications used in most empirical studies of the liquidity spread. Although the
search technology is the same for all assets, heterogeneous bid-ask spreads arise
endogenously. Cross-sectional variation in returns is explained by cross-sectional
variation in share ownership.
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A The Distribution of Types
This appendix studies the steady-state distribution of types, as well as the dy-
namics of the distribution of types near that steady-state. For a given search
intensity allocation λ, the distribution
µ(t) = (µhn(t), µhok(t), µℓok(t), µℓn(t))1≤k≤K
of types solves the system of ordinary differential equations (ODE)
µ˙hn = γuµℓn − γdµhn − 2
K∑
k=1
λkµhnµℓok (43)
µ˙hok = γuµℓok − γdµhok + 2λkµhnµℓok (44)
µ˙ℓn = γdµhn − γuµℓn + 2
K∑
k=1
λkµhnµℓok (45)
µ˙ℓok = γdµhok − γuµℓok − 2λkµhnµℓok (46)
sk = µℓok + µhok (47)
1 =
K∑
k=1
(µℓok + µhok) + µhn + µℓn, (48)
where µ˙ = dµ(t)/dt, and time arguments are suppressed. Since equation (47)
implies that the sum of (44) and (46) is zero, one can eliminate (44), the ODE
for µhok. Similarly, since equation (48) implies that the sum of equations (43) to
(46) is zero, one can eliminate (45), the ODE for µℓn, and obtains the equivalent
system
µ˙ℓok = γdsk − (γd + γu)µℓok − 2λkµhnµℓok (49)
µ˙hn = γu(1− S)− (γd + γu)µhn − 2
K∑
k=1
λkµhnµℓok (50)
µhok = sk − µℓok (51)
µℓn = 1− S − µhn, (52)
for k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
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Proof of Proposition 1 A steady state is a constant distribution µ of types
solving equations (49)-(52). Summing equations (49) over k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, adding
equation (50), and imposing the steady-state condition µ˙ = 0, one finds
µhn = µℓo + y − S, (53)
where µℓo ≡
∑K
k=1 µℓok, and y ≡ γu/(γd + γu) . Replacing this last equation in
(49) gives
µℓok =
γdsk
γd + γu + 2λk (µℓo + y − S)
. (54)
Summing equations (54) over k, one obtains the one equation in one unknown
problem
µℓo −
K∑
k=1
γdsk
γd + γu + 2λk (µℓo + y − S)
= 0. (55)
The left-hand side of this equation is increasing in µℓo, is negative at µℓo = 0, and
is positive for µℓo large enough; thus, it has a unique solution. Once the solution
µℓo is found, µℓok is uniquely determined by (54), µhn by (53), and finally µhok
and µℓn by (51) and (52). This characterizes a unique candidate steady state.
Since the steady-state fractions sum to one by construction, one only needs to
show that they are positive as follows: The left-hand side of (55) is positive when
evaluated at µℓo = S and 1− y; it is negative when evaluated at S − y. Since the
left-hand side of (55) is increasing, this shows that
S − y < µℓo < min{S, 1− y}. (56)
Next, s − y < µℓo implies that µhn > 0 and that µℓok < sk. Finally, µℓo < 1 − y
implies that µhn < 1− S and that 0 < µℓn < 1.
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Local Stability This paragraph establishes that, given λ, the steady-state dis-
tribution of types is a locally stable point of the following ODE
µ˙ℓok = γdsk − (γd + γu)µℓok − 2λkµhnµℓok (57)
µ˙hn = γu(1− S)− (γd + γu)µhn − 2
K∑
k=1
λkµhnµℓok, (58)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Stacking variables as (µℓo1, . . . , µℓok, µhn)
′, the Jacobian of
the ODE at the steady state is
J = −(γd + γu)IK+1 −D, (59)
where D =
[
D11D12
D21D22
]
, D11 = diag (2λkµhn), D12 =
[
2λ1µℓo1 . . . 2λKµℓoK
]′
, D21 =[
2λ1µhn . . . 2λKµhn
]
, and D22 =
∑K
k=1 2λkµℓok.
Lemma 1 (Local Stability.) The eigenvalues of J have strictly negative real
parts.
Proof. The vector (1, . . . 1)′ is denoted by e. One has, by construction, e′D11 = D21
and e′D12 = D22. An eigenvector of J associated with the eigenvalue ξ ∈ C is denoted
y. It solves
(γd + γu)y1 +D11y1 +D12y2 = −ξy1 (60)
(γd + γu)y2 +D12y1 +D22y2 = −ξy2. (61)
Multiplying equation (60) by e′, and subtracting equation (61) gives
(γd + γu + ξ)
(
e′y1 − y2
)
= 0. (62)
We distinguishes three cases.
Case 1: e′y1 6= y2. From (62), it must be that ξ = −(γd + γu) < 0.
Case 2: e′y1 = y2 = 0. Then (60) simplifies to (γd + γu +D11) y1 = −ξy1. Thus, it
must be that ξ = − (γd + γu + 2λkµhn) < 0, for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
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Case 3: e′y1 = y2 6= 0. Without loss of generality, one can assume that y2 = 1. Using
(60) one solves explicitly for y1k,
y1k = −
2λkµℓok
ν + γd + γu + 2λkµhn
. (63)
Since the y1k sum to one, it must be that Re
(∑K
k=1 y1k
)
= 1. Thus, there is one
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such that Re(y1k) > 0, which is equivalent to Re(1/y1k) > 0 and, from
equation (63), to Re(ξ) < − (γd + γu + 2λkµhn) < 0. 
B The Investor’s Problem
This Appendix formulates and solves the stochastic-control problem faced by an
individual investor in a steady-state equilibrium. We show that our preference
specification is essentially equivalent to assuming that: (i) an investor maximizes
the present discounted value of consumption, and (ii) is allowed to borrow and
lend at a risk-free rate r¯ that is equal to his subjective discount rate r, subject
to an appropriate Transversality Condition. We also verify that the Bellman
equations (9)-(12) are sufficient for optimality.
B.1 The Investor’s Problem
Information Time is continuous and runs forever, and some measurable space
(Ω,G) is fixed. An investor can be of either one of finitely many types i ∈ I, with
an initial type j0 ∈ I. We fix some counting process Nt ∈ N
I , where Nt(i) counts
the number of transition to type i during the time interval [0, t]. The sequence of
transition times is denoted by 0 < T0 < T1 < . . ., and the sequence of successive
types by j0, j1, . . . Hence, the process Nt generates a type process it such that,
for all n ∈ N and t ∈ [Tn, Tn + 1), it = jn. We let {Ft , t ≥ 0} be the internal
history (filtration generated by) the process N .
Admissible control A control u is made up of a Ft-predictable R
I-valued tran-
sition intensity process π, and of a Ft-adapted, R+-valued consumption process
c. Given π, we fix a probability Pπ such that the counting process N admits
Pπ-intensity π.
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A transition intensity process is admissible if, at each time, πt belongs to
some state-dependent compact set Π(it−) ∈ R
I . The set Π(i) embeds all feasible
transitions of an investor in state i. For example, if i = hn, π(ℓn) = γd for all
π ∈ Π(i). Similarly, π(ℓok) = 0, because an investor can never transit directly
from i to j. Also, π(hok) = 2λkµℓok. Lastly, the set Π(i) also incorporates the
search-intensity budget constraint. For example, for a buyer hn, we must have∑K
k=1 π(hok)/(2µℓok) ≤ Λ.
When an investor makes a transition from state i to j, he receives a payment
Q(i, j). For example, if i = hn and j = hok, then Q(i, j) = −pk. Conversely, if
i = ℓok and j = ℓn, then Q(i, j) = pk. Hence, the investor’s wealth process solves
the Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE)
dWt = (rWt − ct) dt+D(it) dt+
∑
j∈I
Q(it−, j) dNt(j), (64)
where D(it) is the flow utility enjoyed by the investor from his asset holding.
Namely, D(ℓn) = D(hn) = 0, D(hok) = δ, and D(ℓok) = δ − x, for all k ∈
{1, . . . , K}. We let an investor’s initial wealth be W0. A control u = (π, c) is
admissible if π is admissible and if the wealth process satisfies the Transversality
Condition
lim
T→∞
EPpi
(
WT e
−rT
)
= 0. (65)
The set of admissible control is denoted by U .
Lifetime utility The lifetime utility of an investor applying control u ∈ U is
EPpi
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtct dt
]
, (66)
Substituting the budget constraint (64) into the investor’s objective, one finds
that
∫ T
0
e−rtct dt+ e
−rTWT = W0 +
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
D(it) dt+
∑
j∈I
Q(it−, j) dNt(j)
)
.
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Taking expectations on both sides and using the transversality condition (65),
one finds that the lifetime utility of an investor is equal to W0 + V (π) where
V (π) ≡ EPpi
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
D(it) dt+
∑
j∈I
Q(it−, j) dNt(j)
)]
.
Because of linear utility, and because the interest rate is equal to the subjective
discount rate, an investors is indifferent regarding the timing of his consumption,
as long as the associated wealth process satisfies the Transversality Condition.
The investor’s problem is
sup
u∈U
{W0 + V (π)} .
B.2 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation
We find an optimal control by seeking a collection of continuation utilities J(i),
i ∈ I, solving the system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations
rJ(i) = max
πi∈Π(i)
{
D(i) +
∑
j∈I
πi(j)
(
J(j)− J(i) +Q(i, j)
)}
. (67)
Up to some relabelling, this system of HJB is that solved in the text. It is shown
that the maximum is achieved by some continuation utility J∗(i) and transition
intensity π∗i .
We now verify that the investor’s problem is solved by the control c∗t = rW0+
rJ∗(j0), and π
∗
t = π
∗
it
. We first show
Proposition 7 (Sufficiency) The suppremum utility supπ∈U W0+V (π) is bounded
above by W0 + J
∗(j0), and this upper bound is achieved by the admissible control
(c∗, π∗).
Proof The proof goes in two steps. First, we show that V (π) ≤ J∗(j0), adapting the
proof of Theorem VII,T1 in Bre´maud [1981]. Then we show that the associated wealth
process satisfies the Transversality Condition. For the first part of the proof, let’s
consider any admissible control u. We can write
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J∗(iT )e
−rT = J∗(j0) +
∑
0<Tn≤T
(
J∗(jn)e
−rTn − J∗(jn−1)e
−rTn−1
)
+ J∗(iτT )(e
−rT − e−rτT ), (68)
where τT = sup{Tn, n ≥ 0 : Tn ≤ T}. Equation (68) can be manipulated as follows:
J∗(iT )e
−rT = J∗(j0) +
∑
0<Tn≤T
J∗(jn−1)(e
−rTn − e−rTn−1) + J∗(iτT )(e
−rT − e−rτT )
+
∑
0<Tn≤T
e−rTn (J∗(jn)− J
∗(jn−1))
= J∗(j0) +
∫ T
0
d
dt
(J∗(it)e
−rt) dt+
∫ T
0
∑
j∈I
(
J∗(j)− J∗(it−)
)
e−rt dNt(j)
= J∗(j0) +
∫ T
0

−rJ∗(it) +∑
j∈I
πt(j)
(
J∗(j)− J∗(it−)
) e−rt dt
+
∫ T
0
∑
j∈I
e−rt
(
J∗(j)− J∗(it−)
)(
dNt(j)− πt(j) dt
)
.
Adding
∫ T
0 e
−rtD(it) dt+
∫ T
0
∑
j∈I Q(it−, j) dNt(j) to both sides gives
∫ T
0
e−rtD(it) dt+
∫ T
0
∑
j∈I
Q(it−, j) dNt(j) + J
∗(iT )e
−rT =
J∗(j0) +
∫ T
0
e−rt

−rJ∗(it) +D(it) +∑
j∈I
πt(j)
[
J∗(j)− J∗(it−) +Q(it−, j)
] dt
+
∫ T
0
∑
j∈I
(
J∗(j)− J∗(it−) +Q(it−, j)
)
e−rt
(
dNt(j)− πt(j) dt
)
. (69)
Since
(
J∗(j) − J∗(it−) +Q(it−, j)
)
e−rt is a bounded Ft-predictable process, it follows
by Theorem II, T8 in Bre´maud [1981] that the last term on the right-hand side of (69)
is a martingale. Taking expectations on both sides, and using the HJB equation (67),
one finds
EPpi

∫ T
0
e−rtD(it) dt+
∫ T
0
∑
j∈I
Q(it−, j) dNt(j) + J
∗(iT )e
−rT

 ≤ J∗(j0),
with equality for π = π∗. Letting t go to infinity proves that V (π) ≤ J(j0), with
equality if π = π∗.
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The second step of the proof is to show that the associated wealth process satisfies
the Transversality Condition (65). Replacing c∗t = rW0 + rJ
∗(j0) into the budget
constraint (64), multiplying by e−rt, and integrating from t = 0 to t = T , we find
W ∗T e
−rT =W0e
−rT −J∗(j0)(1−e
−rT )+
∫ T
0
e−rtD(it) dt+
∫ T
0
∑
j∈I
Q(it−, j) dNt(j).
To show that the Transversality Condition is satisfied, one takes expectations EPpi∗ on
both sides, lets T goes to infinity, and uses the fact that
J∗(j0) = EPpi∗

∫ ∞
0
e−rtD(it) dt+
∫ ∞
0
∑
j∈I
Q(it−, j) dNt(j)

 .

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